The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massé and Alejandro Neme ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 437, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents'participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents'shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents'voluntary participation.

Keywords: Division Problem; Single-peaked preferences; Uniform Rule; Voluntary Participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02
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Related works:
Journal Article: The division problem with voluntary participation (2012)
Working Paper: The Division Problem with Voluntary Participation (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:437

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