Investor Protection and Income Inequality: Risk Sharing vs Risk Taking

Alessandra Bonfiglioli ()

No 461, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income in equality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Keywords: Income inequality; risk sharing; Investor protection; optimal financial contracts; risk taking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 E44 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Investor protection and income inequality: Risk sharing vs risk taking (2012)
Working Paper: Investor Protection and Income Inequality: Risk Sharing vs Risk Taking (2010)
Working Paper: Investor Protection and Income Inequality: Risk Sharing vs Risk Taking (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:461

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