The Political Cost of Reforms

Alessandra Bonfiglioli and Gino Gancia
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alessandra Bonfiglioli () and Gino Gancia

No 507, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Keywords: elections; Reforms; Asymmetric Information; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Cost of Reforms (2015)
Working Paper: The Political Cost of Reforms (2012)
Working Paper: The Political Cost of Reforms (2011)
Working Paper: The Political Cost of Reforms (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:507

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