Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms

Nicolas Quérou and David Pérez-Castrillo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Nicolas Quérou and David Perez-Castrillo

No 520, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is "smoother" in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. Unlike in the study by Pérez Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired.

Keywords: mechanism design; NIMBY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Smooth multibidding mechanisms (2012)
Working Paper: Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms (2011)
Working Paper: Smooth multibidding mechanisms (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:520

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