Pharmaceutical Generics, Vertical Product Differentiation, and Public Policy

Antonio Cabrales

No 54, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceutical markets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model can explain the observation that countries with stronger regulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higher proportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closely related model can account for the observed increase in prices by patent owners after entry of generic producers.

Keywords: Pharmaceutical industry; generics; vertical product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I10 I18 L65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Pharmaceutical generics, vertical product differentiation and public policy (2003)
Working Paper: Pharmaceutical generics, vertical product differentiation and public policy (2003)
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