Audit Risk and Rent Extraction: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Brazil
Yves Zamboni and
No 554, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increased audit risk deters rent extraction in three areas of local government activity in Brazil: procurement, health service delivery and cash transfer targeting. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the share of audited resources involved in corruption in procurement by about 10 percentage points and the proportion of procurement processes with evidence of corruption by about 15 percentage points. In contrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly provided preventive and primary health care services - measured through user satisfaction surveys - or compliance with eligibility requirements for the conditional cash transfer program - measured through household inspections. The observed impact heterogeneity across activities is consistent with differences in potential sanctions and in the probability that a sanction is applied, conditional on detection.
Keywords: government audit; corruption; rents; cash transfer program; primary health care; service delivery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D78 H41 H83 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:554
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().