A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'

Flip Klijn

No 567, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents' preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for the rural hospital theorem to hold.

Keywords: stability; matching; many-to-many; rural hospital theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A many-to-many ‘rural hospital theorem’ (2014)
Working Paper: A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem' (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:567

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