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Heterogeneous Information and Trade Policy

Giacomo Ponzetto ()

No 596, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At the same time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection. This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters which explains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In the model, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about the trade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers. In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. The structure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The model predicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there is more public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I …find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Protectionism; Voters; imperfect information; media coverage; Dracula effect; Pareto inefficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-int and nep-pol
Date: 2011-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17) Track citations by RSS feed

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Related works:
Working Paper: Heterogeneous Information and Trade Policy (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Heterogeneous Information and Trade Policy (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Heterogeneous information and trade policy (2011) Downloads
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