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Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers

Salvador Barberà () and Danilo Coelho ()

No 696, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: Rules of k names are frequently used methods to appoint individuals to office. They are two-stage procedures where a ?first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from an initial set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. In practice, the list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers screen the proposed candidates by voting for v of them and then choose those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. Our main purpose in this paper is to study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. From a positive point of view, we analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. From a normative point of view, we study the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.

Keywords: voting rules; constitutional design; Strong Nash equilibrium; rule of k names (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hpe, nep-hrm and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Balancing the power to appoint officers (2017) Downloads
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