Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage

Sarolta Laczó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sarolta Laczó () and Arpad J. Abraham ()

No 697, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We extend the model of risk sharing with limited commitment (Kocherlakota, 1996) by introducing both a public and a private (non-contractible and/or non-observable) storage technology. Positive public storage relaxes future participation constraints and may hence improve risk sharing, contrary to the case where hidden income or effort is the deep friction. The characteristics of constrained-efficient allocations crucially depend on the storage technology's return. In the long run, if the return on storage is (i) moderately high, both assets and the consumption distribution may remain time-varying; (ii) sufficiently high, assets converge almost surely to a constant and the consumption distribution is time-invariant; (iii) equal to agents' discount rate, perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing. Agents never have an incentive to use their private storage technology, i.e., Euler inequalities are always satisfied, at the constrained-efficient allocation of our model, while this is not the case without optimal public asset accumulation.

Keywords: risk sharing; limited commitment; hidden storage; dynamic contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dge and nep-mac
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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage (2018)
Working Paper: Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage (2016)
Working Paper: Efficient risk sharing with limited commitment and storage (2014)
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