Voting by Committees under Constraints

Alejandro Neme (), Jordi Massó and Salvador Barberà ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 7, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Keywords: voting; strategy-proofness; additive and separable preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting by committees under constraints (2005)
Working Paper: Voting by Committees under Constraints (2003)
Working Paper: Voting by Committees under Constraints (2001)
Working Paper: Voting by Committees Under Constraints (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:7

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