Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation
Salvador Barberà (),
Dolors Berga and
Bernardo Moreno ()
No 773, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top trading cycle solution, respectively. We embed these three types of problems into a general framework. We then notice that the three rules, as well as many others, do share a common set of properties, which together imply their (partial) group strategy-proofness. This proves that the equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness in all these cases is not a fortuitous event, but results from the structure of the functions under consideration.
Keywords: matching; division; house allocation; strategy-proofness; group strategy-proofness; group monotonicity; non-bossiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:773
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