Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

Bettina Klaus (), Jordi Massó and Flip Klijn
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 78, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples' preferences are "responsive," i.e., when Gale and Shapleyís (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be manipulated by couples acting as singles.

Keywords: stability; matching; couples (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (2007)
Working Paper: Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:78

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