On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness

Jordi Massó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 828, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich do- main of preference profiles. We show that if the social choice function satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the social choice function an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the notion of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.

Keywords: strategy-proofness; anonymity; single-peakedness; unanimity; tops-onlyness; semilattice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Working Paper: On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness (2015)
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