Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth
Salvador Barberà (),
Dolors Berga and
Bernardo Moreno ()
No 893, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
We study a notion of non-manipulability by groups, based on the idea that only some agreements among potential manipulators may be credible. The derived notion of immunity to credible manipulations by groups is intermediate between individual and group strategy-proofness. Our main non-recursive definition turns out to be equivalent, in our context, to the requirement that truthful preference revelation should be a strong coalition-proof equilibrium, as recursively defined by Peleg and Sudholter (1998,1999). We provide characterizations of strategy-proof rules separating those that satisfy it from those that do not for a large family of public good decision problems.
Keywords: strategy-proofness; group strategy-proofness; credibility; Voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Immunity to credible deviations from the truth (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:893
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().