Access to Power, Political Institutions and Ethnic Favoritism
Hannes Mueller and
No 901, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics
We use a dataset which codes executive power for 564 ethnic groups in 130 countries on a seven-point scale to show that ethnic groups that gain political power benefit economically. This effect holds for groups that enter government, the extensive margin, and for groups that concentrate more power onto themselves, the intensive margin. Both these effects disappear in the presence of strong political constraints on executive power. Institutional constraints are even effective in preventing favoritism when groups concentrate all power in the executive onto themselves.
Keywords: favoritism; political institutions; night light data; ethnic conflict; executive constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O43 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro and nep-pol
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