Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions
Salvador Barberà () and
Antonio Nicolo' ()
No 904, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
We consider collective decision problems where some agents have private information about alternatives and others don't. Voting takes place under strategy-proof rules. Prior to voting, informed agents may or may not disclose their private information, thus eventually influencing the preferences of those initially uninformed. We provide general conditions on the voting rules guaranteeing that informed agents will always be induced to disclose what they know. In particular, we apply our general result to environments where agents' preferences are restricted to be single-peaked, and characterize the strategy-proof rules that ensure information disclosure in this setting.
Keywords: strategy-proofness; information disclosure; voting rules; Single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:904
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