Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogenous Workers with Preferences over Peers

Flip Klijn

No 960, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study the problem of allocating projects to heterogenous workers. The simultaneous execution of multiple projects imposes constraints across project teams. Each worker has preferences over the combinations of projects in which he can potentially participate and his team members in any of these projects. We propose a revelation mechanism that is Pareto-efficient and group strategy-proof (Theorem 1). We also identify two preference domains on which the mechanism is strongly group strategy-proof (Theorem 2). Our results subsume results by Monte and Tumennasan (2013) and Kamiyama (2013).

Keywords: matching; allocation; heterogenous agents; preferences over peers; efficiency; (group) strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:960

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