Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein (wettstn@bgu.ac.il)

No 906, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2009
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http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/0906.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities (2010)
Working Paper: Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities (2008)
Working Paper: Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0906

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