Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style

David Wettstein () and Todd Kaplan

No 1607, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Keywords: contests; innovation; all-pay auctions; mechanism design. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D44 L12 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-sog
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Related works:
Journal Article: Two-stage contests with preferences over style (2022)
Working Paper: Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1607

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