SIGNALING IN CONTESTS

Tomer Ifergane and Aner Sela

No 1708, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Keywords: Contests; signaling; asymmetric information; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Signaling in Contests (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1708

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