STRONG ROBUSTNESS TO INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND THE UNIQUENESS OF A CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM
Ezra Einy (),
Ori Haimanko and
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Ezra Einy: BGU
No 1901, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics
Keywords: strong robustness to incomplete information; Nash equilibrium; correlated equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1901
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