End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner's dilemma supergames

Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker
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Rolf Stoecker: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 123, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Date: 2017-04-04
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