Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets

Claus-Jochen Haake ()

No 366, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.

Keywords: Object division market; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; Support result (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-12
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315428/2319788 First Version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets (2009)
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