Convex games, clan games, and their marginal games

Rodica Branzei, Dinko Dimitrov and Stef Tijs
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Rodica Branzei: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Stef Tijs: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 368, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. As it turns out, a cooperative game is convex if and only if all its marginal games are superadditive, and a monotonic game satisfying the veto player property with respect to the members of a coalition C is a total clan game (with clan C) if and only if all its C-based marginal games are subadditive.

Keywords: Marginal games; Characterization; Superadditive games; Subadditive games; Convex games; Total clan games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:368

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