Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

Claus-Jochen Haake () and Bettina Klaus ()

No 372, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.

Keywords: Stability; Nash implementation; Matching with contracts; (Maskin) monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315479/2319798 First Version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (2009)
Working Paper: Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (2007)
Working Paper: Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (2006)
Working Paper: Monotonicity and nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (2005)
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