On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games

Shao Chin Sung and Dinko Dimitrov
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Shao Chin Sung: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 374, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.

Keywords: Core; Additivity; Coalition formation; Hedonic games; Co-NP completeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:374

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