Government versus opposition. Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?

Dinko Dimitrov and Claus-Jochen Haake ()

No 375, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the "most" stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Winning coalitions; Simple games; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315485/2319800 First Version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:375

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