On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability

Dinko Dimitrov

No 377, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide.

Keywords: Hedonic games; Semistrict core; Coalition formation; Top coalition property; Common ranking property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-12
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315463/2319794 First Version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability (2006)
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