A simplicial algorithm approach to Nash equilibria in concave games

Claus-Jochen Haake () and Francis Edward Su
Additional contact information
Francis Edward Su: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 382, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: In this paper we demonstrate a new method for computing approximate Nash equilibria in n-person games. Strategy spaces are assumed to be represented by simplices, while payoff functions are assumed to be concave. Our procedure relies on a simplicial algorithm that traces paths through the set of strategy profiles using a new variant of Sperner's Lemma for labelled triangulations of simplotopes, which we prove in this paper. Our algorithm uses a labelling derived from the satisficing function of Geanakoplos (2003) and can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for payoff functions that are not necessarily linear. Finally, in bimatrix games, we can compare our simplicial algorithm to the combinatorial algorithm proposed by Lemke & Howson (1964).

Keywords: Strategy labelling; Simplicial algorithm; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-15
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315652/2319825 First Version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:382

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bettina Weingarten ().