An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Walter Trockel

No 426, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form game G^S^d is defined that has an infinity of weakly subgame perfect equilibria whose payoff vectors coincide with that of the sequential Raiffa solution of (S,d). Moreover all those equilibria share the same equilibrium path consisting of proposing the Raiffa solution and accepting it in the first stage of the game. By a modification of G^S^d the analogous result is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation of a sequential Raiffa (solution based) social choice rule in subgame perfect equilibrium.

Keywords: Raiffa solution; Solution based social choice rule; Implementation; Nash program; Non-cooperative foundation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2316443/2319868 First Version, 2009 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution (2011)
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