Distorted Voronoi languages
Manuel Förster and
Frank Riedel ()
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Manuel Förster: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Manuel Foerster
No 458, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are simple and types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so-called Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set and Bayesian estimators on the side of receivers. In this note, we introduce conflicts of interest in the same setting. We characterize strict Nash equilibria as distorted Voronoi languages that use all messages. For large conflicts, such informative equilibria need not exist. If the bias is sufficiently small, however, these equilibria do exist. This establishes the robustness of the results in Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) to biased interests. We finally give examples of strict Nash equilibria, one of them using simulations to illustrate an equilibrium with many messages and non-uniformly distributed types.
Keywords: Cheap Talk; Signaling Game; Communication Game; Voronoi tesselation; Conflict of Interest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2900982/2900985 First Version, 2011 (application/x-download)
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