Coordination with independent private values: why pedestrians sometimes bump into each other

Christoph Kuzmics

No 501, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games, however, also have other (pure strategy)equilibria with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination. Perhaps surprisingly, in some such games, these Pareto-inefficient equilibria, with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination, are the only evolutionarily stable equilibria of the game.

Keywords: evolutionary stability; best-response dynamics; CSS; incomplete information; continuously stable strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2014-05-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2675336/2901868 First Version, 2014 (application/x-download)

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Working Paper: Coordination with Independent Private Values: why Pedestrians sometimes bump into each other (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:501

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