A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values

Christoph Kuzmics

No 504, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.

Keywords: public good provision; asymmetric information; dominant strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 5
Date: 2016-03-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:504

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