Preferences under ignorance

Olivier Gossner and Christoph Kuzmics

No 546, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: A decision maker (DM) makes choices from di erent sets of alternatives. The DM is initially fully ignorant of the payo associated to each alternative, and learns these payo s only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option once payo s are learned, the optimal choice rule from sets of alternatives is one that is as if the DM had strict preferences over all alternatives. Under this model, the DM has preferences for preferences while being ignorant of what preferences are \right".

Keywords: consistency; strict preference; rationality; weak axiom of revealed preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2015-09-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2775892/2775894 First Version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: PREFERENCES UNDER IGNORANCE (2019)
Working Paper: Preferences under ignorance (2018)
Working Paper: Preferences under ignorance (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:546

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