Cognitive empathy in conflict situations

Florian Gauer and Christoph Kuzmics

No 551, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent’s preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information the probability of getting informed about the opponent’s preferences is bounded away from zero and one.

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Information Acquisition; Theory of Mind; Conflict; Imperfect Empathy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42
Date: 2016-01-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-mic, nep-neu, nep-soc and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2900386/2900387 First Version, 2016 (application/x-download)

Related works:
Journal Article: COGNITIVE EMPATHY IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:551

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