Stochastic nonzero-sum games: a new connection between singular control and optimal stopping
Tiziano de Angelis and
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Tiziano de Angelis: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Giorgio Ferrari: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
No 565, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of 2-player nonzerosum games of optimal stopping and certain 2-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is attained by hitting times at two separate boundaries, then such boundaries also trigger a Nash equilibrium in the game of singular control. Moreover a differential link between the players' value functions holds across the two games.
Keywords: games of singular control; games of optimal stopping; Nash equilibrium; onedimensional diffusion; Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation; verification theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:565
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