Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors

Marieke Pahlke

No 599, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: This paper generalizes the concept of Sequential Equilibrium to allow for ambiguous incomplete information about types or states. We characterize conditions that ensure existence of Sequential Equilibria under ambiguous incomplete information. Under these conditions players form subjective prior belief sets that satisfy a rectangularity condition which leads to dynamically consistent behavior. Furthermore, we give an example which shows that ambiguity can introduce new Sequential Equilibria.

Keywords: sequential equilibrium; ambiguity; dynamic consistency; multiple priors; imprecise information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54
Date: 2018-08-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2930492/2930576 First Version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:599

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