Coalition probabilities in a non-cooperative model of three-persons quota game bargaining

Reinhard Selten

No 61, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Date: 2017-04-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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