Socio-legal Systems and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Debreu-Hurwicz Equilibrium
Claus-Jochen Haake and
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Claus-Jochen Haake: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Walter Trockel: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
No 647, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
In this article we combine Debreuâ€™s (1952) social system with Hurwiczâ€™s (1994, 2008) ideas of embedding a â€œdesiredâ€ game form into a â€œnaturalâ€ game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is â€œillegalâ€ according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreuâ€™s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu-Hurwicz equilibria.We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nashâ€™s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium.
Keywords: socio-legal systems; implementation; social systems; generalized games; Nash demand game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:647
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