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Farsighted Rationality in Hedonic Games

Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa and Dominik Karos
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Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Dominik Karos: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 654, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which at each possible partition any new coalition can decide the probability with which to form and leave the current partition. These probabilities are commonly known so that farsighted players can decide whether or not to support a coalition's move: they know which future partition, and hence payoffs, will be reached with what probability. We show that if coalitions make mistakes with positive probability, i.e., if they choose probabilities that are always above some $\varepsilon>0$, then there is a behavior profile in which no coalition has a profitable one-shot deviation.

Keywords: abstract games; hedonic games; farsighted stability; coalition stable equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2021-10-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-gth
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