Ambiguous Social Choice Functions
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Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
No 660, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only if there exists a nonempty subset of voters, called the set of top voters, such that at each preference profile, the range of the selected act equals the set of top-ranked candidates of top voters. We provide a full characterization of the class of unanimous, strategyproof, and anonymous ASCFs, and provide a large subclass of ASCFs that satisfy the additional property of neutrality.
Keywords: Social Choice Function; Ambiguity Aversion; Ellsberg Urns; Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; Anonymity; Neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:660
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