TU-Games: Revisiting Fundamental Concepts

Walter Trockel and Papatya Duman
Additional contact information
Walter Trockel: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Papatya Duman: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 757, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: This article addresses conceptual shortcomings in recent literature on coalitional TU-games. We revisit and partly redefine key notions such as coalition, coalition function, efficiency, and duality, emphasizing their dependence on the class of TU-games under scrutiny. Unlike approaches that exclude non-cohesive games or rely on imputations, we propose a broader framework grounded in aspiration. We also introduce a refined notion of a dual game, which aligns better with its typical interpretation and coincides with the classical version on superadditive games. Finally, we characterize the cohesive hull of a game via the duality theorem in linear programming, drawing parallels to the construction of the core via the Bondareva-Shapley theorem.

Keywords: TU-games; duality; core; c-Core; cohesive games; complete game efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2025-12-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/3012428/3012429 First Version, 2025 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:757

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bettina Weingarten ().