Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions

Anirban Kar (), Indrajit Ray () and Roberto Serrano

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Correlated Equilibrium Distribution; Implementation; Monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.cal.bham.ac.uk/pdf/05-18.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions (2007)
Working Paper: Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions (2005)
Working Paper: Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:05-18

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