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Aggregative Games

Martin Jensen ()

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: An abstract notion of aggregative games is introduced and a pure strategy Nash equilibrium shown to exist for such games. Convergence of best-reply improvement dynamics is also studied. All assumptions are straight-forward to check in concrete applications. The paper’s results generalize the main results of Dubey et al. (2006) and Kukushkin (2005). Likewise, the aggregator concept of Alos-Ferrer and Ania (2005) and Schipper (2005) is a special case. The relationship with both is studied in detail. A number of examples illustrate the paper’s main findings. Among these a model of open source development may be of some independent interest.

Keywords: Aggregative Games; Aggregation; Strategic Substitutes; Nash Equilibrium; Potential Game; Best-reply Dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Chapter: Aggregative games (2018) Downloads
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