Investment and Expropriation under Oligarchy and Democracy in a Heckscher-Ohlin World

Facundo Albornoz, Sebastian Galiani and Daniel Heymann

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and obligarchy. We model a two-sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper-Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. We show how incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects of the investment and how these affect the interests of the group in power. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and the structural features of the economy such as factor intensity. We characterize expropriation equilibria and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively, democracies are generally more prone to expropriate. This result provides one possible rationalization for the wave of expropriation equilibria and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively, democracies are generally more prone to expropriate. This result provides one possible rationalization for the wave of expropriations in Latin America under governments with a broad popular base during the 20th Century.

Keywords: Expropriation; political regimes; democracy; oligarchy; foreign investments; Stolper-Samuelson (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 H71 O15 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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