A Ramsey Bound on Stable Sets in Jordan Pillage Games

Manfred Kerber and Colin Rowat

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: Jordan [2006] defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a ‘power function’ satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We use graph theory to reinterpret this result, tightening the bound, highlighting the role played by resource monotonicity, and suggesting a strategy for yet tighter bounds.

Keywords: Pillage; cooperative game theory; stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:09-01

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