Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information

Chirantan Ganguly and Indrajit Ray ()

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We consider a Battle of the Sexes game with two types, High and Low, for each player and allow cheap talk regarding players' types before the game. We prove that the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium exists for a low range of prior probability of the High-Type. This equilibrium has a desirable type-coordination property: it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilbrium when the players' types are different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful, for a medium range of prior probability of the High-type.

Keywords: Battle of the Sexes; Private Information; Cheap Talk; Coordination; Full Revelation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:13-01

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