Family Ownership and Firm-Level Nature Dependence

Oskar Kowalewski, Oleksandr Talavera () and Thanh Nam Vu
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Oskar Kowalewski: IESEG School of Management
Oleksandr Talavera: University of Birmingham
Thanh Nam Vu: University of Birmingham

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: This study examines whether family ownership is associated with lower firm-level dependence on ecosystem services. Using a panel of U.S. listed firms from 2010 to 2023, we find that family firms exhibit lower nature dependence than their non-family counterparts. The results are more consistent with long-term orientation than with generic risk aversion: the dependence-reducing effect of family ownership is stronger among firms with higher capital expenditure, unrelated to leverage, and shaped by governance structure. In particular, the effect is stronger among firms with a corporate governance committee and weaker among firms with politically connected boards. These findings are consistent with stewardship theory and support a context-dependent view of family firm behaviour. Overall, our results suggests that ownership structure is an important determinant of firms' exposure to physical nature risk, and that family ownership may mitigate such exposure through long-horizon strategic choices that reduce reliance on vulnerable ecosystem services.

Keywords: Temperature; nature dependence; family ownership; corporate governance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 M14 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2026-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:26-03

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