The Optimal Size for a Minority

Hillel Rapoport () and Avi Weiss

No 2001-01, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate a setting in which members of a population, bifurcated into a majority and a minority, transact with randomly matched partners. All members are uniformly altruistic, and each transaction can be carried out cooperatively or through a market mechanism, with cooperative transactions saving on transaction costs. Externalities are introduced, whereby cooperation by members of one group and the

Keywords: Altruism; Minorities; Ethnic groups; Religious Groups; Relative group size; Social Conflicts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 J15 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: The optimal size for a minority (2003)
Working Paper: The Optimal Size for a Minority (2001)
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